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BAR BRIEFS
A CANADIAN VIEW OF THE SACCO -VANZETTI CASE
Several phrases employed by Prof. Fowler V. Harper of the Uni-
versity of North Dakota, in his review of the Felix Frankfurter book,
(Dakota Law Review for October, 1927) brought such a shock to
some of our North Dakota attorneys, and appeared to be so complete-
ly out of harmony with the conclusions reached by those who had
given the matter the fullest consideration, that we direct attention once
again to that now famous case by quoting the summary presented by
the Honorable William Renwick Riddell, LL.D., D. C. L., of the On-
tario Bar. Justice Riddell's analysis will be found in the December
number of the American Bar Association Journal, the summarization
of the conclusion being as follows:
"i. That no evidence was wrongly excluded or admitted; 2. That
the evidence which is considered to be so fatal to the accused was
given by themselves in their defense against the advice of the Trial
Judge; 3. That neither Judge nor prosecuting counsel was guilty of
misconduct before the jury; 4. That there was a fair trial; 5. That
there was ample evidence upon which a jury might convict; 6. That
there is nothing but subsequent declamation and vituperation to suggest
prejudice or failure to perform their duty on the part of the jury;
7. That the refusal of the motions for a new trial cannot be held erron-
eous; 8. That the great delay in executing the sentence was due to the
motions made by the condemned men and the extraordinary tenderness
of the law of Massachusetts in respect of one convicted of crime apply-
ing to her courts for protection from injustice; 9. If the accused should
not have been convicted, the error is that of the jury and not of- the
court or its officers."
WILLS
Mr. Sumner Kenner, Judge of the Indiana Circuit Court, discusses
Non-Contesting Clauses in Wills in the January issue of the Indiana
Law Journal, and submits the following summarization of principles
from conflicting authorities:
i. Conditions annexed to legacies and devises, providing for for-
feiture in case the will is contested, are valid.
2. In case of a legacy, it is best to provide for a gift over of the
subject matter of the legacy in case of a breach of the condition.
3. Where the will is contested on behalf of an infant legatee or
devisee, the forfeiture will not be decreed, irrespective of whether
there was a gift over or not.
4. In the preparation of the clause against contest, it is advisable,
if practicable, to make the condition precedent so that the gift will not
vest until the condition is performed, or in other words, make the
bequests upon the condition that the legatees acquiesce in the provisions
of the will.
5. Probable cause exceptions should be recognized as it comes
most nearly approximating justice in all cases, both from the stand-
point of public policy and from the probable intention of the testator.
It would give effect to the intentions of a rational testator in so far as
it would prevent the perpetration of such fraud and at the same time
exclude vexatious contests brought in bad faith without probable
cause, and which the testator probably wanted to guard against.
